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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
David Oddi was catastrophically injured in a one-vehicle 
accident when the truck he was driving struck a guardrail 
and a bridge abutment. Thereafter, he filed two separate 
product liability actions in state court. He sued Ford Motor 
Company, which designed and manufactured the chassis of 
the truck, and he brought a separate action against 
Grumman Allied Industries, Inc. (then known as Olson 
Bodies, Inc), which designed and manufactured thefinished 
truck. Ford and Grumman removed the actions to the 
district court where they were consolidated.1 Ford and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Jurisdiction in the district court was premised upon diversity of 
citizenship. 28 U. S. C. S 1332. Oddi is a citizen of Pennsylvania. Ford 
is a Delaware corporation and Grumman is a New York corporation. 
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Grumman eventually moved for summary judgment based 
upon their contention that Oddi could not establish a prima 
facie case because his proposed expert testimony failed to 
satisfy the requirements of Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579 (1993). The district 
court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of 
Ford and Grumman, and against Oddi. The district court 
subsequently denied Oddi's motion for reconsideration, and 
this appeal followed. For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm. 
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY. 
 
On June 21, 1993, Oddi was driving a bread truck owned 
and maintained by Continental Baking Company. He was 
proceeding northbound at exit 14 of Interstate 79 near 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, at approximately 55 to 60 miles 
an hour when the truck struck a guardrail and bridge 
abutment. Oddi's legs were crushed so badly by the force of 
the accident that they both had to be amputated. Oddi's left 
arm was also permanently injured. 
 
The truck was a 1976 special order Ford M-5000 
Stripped Chassis that Continental had ordered through a 
Ford dealership for use as a bread delivery truck. When the 
truck left Ford's possession and control it was comprised 
only of basic component parts such as frame rails, axles, 
engine, drive train, wheels and a front bumper. Continental 
took delivery of the Stripped Chassis and delivered it to 
Grumman for the design and manufacture of the finished 
vehicle. Grumman designed and manufactured all 
necessary aspects of the vehicle pursuant to Continental's 
specifications. This included modifications to the occupant 
compartment ("cab") and floor boards. Continental had 
used the truck as a bread delivery truck from 1976 through 
1993, and it had been driven for hundreds of thousands of 
miles in that capacity before this accident occurred.2 
 
The suits that Oddi filed after his accident asserted 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. It is impossible to determine exactly how many miles it had been 
driven because the maintenance records are missing, and the odometer 
had turned over an unknown number of times. 
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claims against Ford and Grumman under theories of strict 
liability, negligence, breach of warranty and failure to warn.3 
Oddi claimed Ford's defective design of the front bumper of 
the bread truck allowed the underside of the truck to ride 
up or "ramp" onto the guardrail and strike the bridge 
abutment.4 He also claimed that after the truck ramped 
onto the guardrail, the left front wheel of the truck hooked 
over the rail preventing him from steering away from the 
bridge abutment. He alleged that defects in the cab 
(designed and manufactured by Grumman) had caused the 
flooring to bend upon impact with the bridge abutment and 
apply such force as to crush both his legs. He also alleged 
that the truck rolled over and down an adjacent 
embankment after it struck the bridge abutment. 
 
Ford denied any design defects and also denied that the 
truck ramped the guardrail. According to Ford, the truck 
simply struck the guardrail and rolled over it. Similarly, 
Grumman denied that the flooring was deficient or that it 
caused any injury at all.5 
 
Oddi retained two experts to support his contention that 
his injuries were caused by defects in the manufacture and 
design of the truck. John N. Noettl, an engineer, was 
retained to testify about the defective design, and Leon 
Kazarian, a bio-mechanist, was retained to testify about the 
process by which Oddi received his injuries. 
 
After deposing both of Oddi's experts, Ford and 
Grumman moved for summary judgment. Ford argued that 
all of Oddi's claims should be dismissed because Oddi's 
proposed expert testimony could not survive the threshold 
inquiry required under Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Oddi also asserted negligence claims against the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation ("PennDOT") based upon 
the design of the guardrails and the bridge abutment. However, the 
record does not disclose the status of that action. 
 
4. Oddi also asserted steering defects against Ford. However, after 
discovery, he dismissed those claims. 
 
5. Ford and Grumman also filed third-party complaints against PennDOT 
in the removed action in district court. However, they subsequently 
voluntarily dismissed that action. Consequently, PennDOT was no longer 
a party in the district court action and is not a party in this appeal. 
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Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579 (1993), and, therefore, 
Oddi could not establish a prima facie case. Grumman did 
not initially make a specific challenge under Daubert. 
Instead, Grumman initially argued only that Oddi's 
evidence was either inadmissible or failed to satisfy Oddi's 
burden of proof. 
 
Oddi responded to the summary judgment motions by 
filing a brief in opposition, an affidavit of Noettl, and 
excerpts of Noettl's deposition testimony. Oddi did not 
request an evidentiary hearing or oral argument, nor did he 
submit anything else in response to Ford's Daubert 
challenge. 
 
After reviewing Oddi's submissions in opposition to the 
summary judgment motions, Grumman filed a reply brief in 
which it argued that Oddi still could not meet his burden 
of showing that the truck was not crashworthy. Grumman 
also challenged Oddi's experts under Daubert. Oddi 
responded by filing a motion to strike Grumman's reply 
brief claiming that the district court had not granted leave 
to Grumman to file it. In the alternative, Oddi sought leave 
to submit opposing affidavits if needed. 
 
On March 31, 1999, the district court entered a 
Memorandum Opinion in which it ruled that Oddi's experts 
did not meet Daubert's admissibility standards. Absent the 
testimony of those experts, Oddi could not establish a 
prima facie case of liability, and the district court therefore 
granted summary judgment in favor of Ford and Grumman. 
 
Oddi filed a motion for reconsideration in which his 
major argument was that the district court should have 
held a hearing on the Daubert challenge before granting 
summary judgment. However, the district court disagreed 
and on September 2, 1999, denied his motion for 
reconsideration. Oddi then sent a letter to the district court 
enclosing a copy of our August 2, 1999 decision in Padillas 
v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 1999). Oddi 
argued that Padillas required that an evidentiary hearing be 
held so that he could meet the defendants' Daubert 
challenges. However, the district court disagreed and issued 
a supplemental Memorandum Opinion in which it held that 
Oddi was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. 
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This appeal followed. 
 
II. THEORIES OF LIABILITY. 
 
Although Oddi based his suits upon several different 
theories of liability, he only appeals the district court's 
grant of summary judgment on his crashworthiness and 
negligent failure to test claims. We will begin our inquiry by 
discussing each of those theories. 
 
A. Crashworthiness. 
 
"The term crashworthiness means the protection that a 
motor vehicle affords its passenger against personal injury 
or death as a result of a motor vehicle accident." Kuptez v. 
Deere & Co., Inc., 644 A.2d 1213, 1218 (Pa. Super. 1994). 
The doctrine "imposes liability on the manufacturer not for 
causing the accident, but rather for failing to minimize the 
injuries or even increasing the severity of the injuries 
sustained in an accident brought about by a cause other 
than the alleged defect." Habecker v. Clark Equipment Co., 
36 F.3d 278, 283 (3d Cir. 1994)("Habecker III"). "[T]he 
crashworthiness doctrine permits a plaintiff to recover for 
enhanced injuries, i. e., only for those injuries he can prove 
he would not have sustained if he had been riding in a 
crashworthy vehicle." Carrasquilla v. Mazda Motor Corp., 
963 F. Supp. 455, 458 (M. D. Pa. 1997)(citations and 
internal quotations omitted). "[I]f enhanced injuries cannot 
be shown, then no liability exists as to the manufacturer." 
Id. 
 
Crashworthiness is a subset of products liability law.6 
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet 
adopted the crashworthiness doctrine for products liability 
cases,7 we have predicted that it would do so in an 
appropriate case. See Habecker v. Clark Equipment Co., 942 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. "In a typical products liability action in Pennsylvania, a plaintiff 
must 
show: (1) the product was defective; (2) the defect existed while the 
product was in the control of the manufacturer; and (3) the defect was 
the proximate cause of the injuries." Habecker III, 36 F.3d at 284. 
 
7. Because this is a diversity case, Pennsylvania products liability law 
applies. Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412, 413 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1991)("Habecker II").8 To establish a 
cause of action on a theory of crashworthiness, a plaintiff 
must show: (1) the design9 of the product was defective; (2) 
an alternative, safer design that was practical existed; (3) 
what injuries, if any, the plaintiff would have received had 
the alternative design been used; and (4) the defective 
design caused or exacerbated specific injuries. 10 Barker v. 
Deere and Co., 60 F.3d 158, 161 n.3 (3d Cir. 1995)(citation 
omitted). 
 
B. Negligent Failure to Test. 
 
Oddi alleged that Ford and Grumman were negligent for 
"[f]ailing to do adequate, necessary and proper testing of 
the vehicle prior to the sale which would have revealed the 
dangerous condition of the product." Complaint, at P 4r. 
Oddi refers to this theory of recovery as the tort of 
"negligent failure to test." Oddi's Br. at 26. He claims that 
its elements are as set forth in 1836 Callowhill Street v. 
Johnson Controls, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 460 (E. D. Pa. 1993). 
Oddi argues that under 1836 Callowhill Street  he can 
recover under this theory if he establishes that: (1) the 
manufacturer has a duty to test its product; (2) the 
manufacturer breached that duty, i. e., the manufacturer 
did not test; and (3) the breach or the failure to test was the 
proximate cause of the plaintiff 's injury. Oddi's Br. at 26. 
 
In 1836 Callowhill, the court made several assumptions 
for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The Pennsylvania Superior Court accepted the crashworthiness 
doctrine in 1994. Kupetz v. Deere & Co., Inc. , 644 A.2d 1213 (Pa. Super. 
1994). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has subsequently, referred to 
the crashworthiness doctrine, but has not yet officially adopted it. See 
Schroeder v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of 
Transportation, 710 A.2d 23, 28 n.8 (Pa. 1998). 
 
9. We have noted that "[t]he theory of products liability is applied to 
three types of defects: design, manufacturing and marketing (warnings). 
The crashworthiness doctrine implicates the overtures of design defects." 
Habecker III, 36 F.3d at 283 n.6. 
 
10. It has been suggested that the third and fourth elements of the 
crashworthiness doctrine are corollaries. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 
738 (3d Cir. 1976). 
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The court assumed that defendant's product was defective, 
that the defect caused the alleged damage, and that the 
defendant had a duty to adequately test the defective 
product to discover the defect. Nevertheless, the court 
granted summary judgment to the defendant as to 
plaintiff 's negligence claim. The court concluded that 
plaintiff did not "offer[ ] sufficient evidence of a breach of 
that duty [to] create a genuine dispute of fact." Id. at 465. 
Consequently, although the court stated, that "[n]egligent 
failure to test is cognizable as a common law negligence 
theory," 819 F. Supp. at 464-65, that decision cannot fairly 
be said to support the proposition that a manufacturer has 
a general duty to test a product to determine if it is 
defective. 
 
Therefore, even if 1836 Callowhill were precedential and 
correctly stated the law of Pennsylvania, we would still be 
compelled to conclude that Oddi has cited no authority that 
establishes the principle that a manufacturer has a general 
duty to test its product. We have found no authority to 
support Oddi's contention that Pennsylvania recognizes an 
independent tort for "negligent failure to test," and Oddi 
has offered none. 
 
Rather, it appears that Oddi's "negligent failure to test" 
claim is, at bottom, nothing more than a routine products 
liability case based on negligence, and that the claimed 
negligence is the failure to test. Under Pennsylvania law, in 
order for an injured party to establish a cause of action 
against a manufacturer based upon the latter's breach of a 
duty, "the plaintiff must prove, not only that the product 
was defective and that the defect caused his[/her] injury, 
but in addition, [the plaintiff must prove] that in 
manufacturing or supplying the product the defendant 
failed to exercise due care." Dambacher v. Malis, 485 A.2d 
408, 424 (Pa. Super. 1984). Thus, Oddi must first establish 
that the vehicle was defective. 
 
Thus, whether we view Oddi's theory as crashworthiness 
or negligence arising from a failure to test, he must 
establish a defect in the design of the truck in order to 
recover, and he must then show that that defect caused his 
injuries. As noted above, he attempted to do this through 
the proffered expert testimony of John N. Noettl and Leon 
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Kazarian, but the district court refused to admit their 
expert testimony. 
 
III. STANDARDS FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF 
       EXPERT TESTIMONY. 
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states: 
 
       If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
       will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
       or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
       an expert by knowledge skill, experience, training, or 
       education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion 
       or otherwise. 
 
The Supreme Court amplified the operation and scope of 
Rule 702 in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
supra. There, the Court held that scientific knowledge 
requires 
 
       an inference or assertion . . . derived by the scientific 
       method. Proposed testimony must be supported by 
       appropriate validation -- i.e., "good grounds," based on 
       what is known. In short, the requirement that an 
       expert's testimony pertain to "scientific knowledge" 
       establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability. 
 
Id. at 590. Rule 702 thus "clearly contemplates some 
degree of regulation of the subjects about which an expert 
may testify." Id. at 589. Consequently, the Court 
established a "gatekeeping role for the [trial] judge." Id. at 
597. 
 
       [T]he trial judge must determine at the outset, 
       pursuant to Rule 104(a),11 whether the expert is 
       proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) 
       will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine 
       a fact in issue. This entails a preliminary assessment 
       of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying 
       the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Fed. R. Evid. 104(a) provides: "Preliminary questions concerning the 
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, 
or 
the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to 
the provisions of subsection (b)[pertaining to conditional admissions]. 
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       reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to 
       the facts in issue. 
 
Id. at 592-93. The proponent must satisfy this burden "by 
a preponderance of proof." Id. at 593 n.10. 
 
Although "[m]any factors will bear on the inquiry," the 
Court has set out some "general observations," Id. at 593, 
that serve as guideposts in determining if proffered expert 
testimony is sufficiently relevant and reliable to be 
admissible.12 First, "a key question to be answered in 
determining whether a theory or technique is scientific 
knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether 
it can be (and has been) tested." Id. Second, the court 
should consider "whether the theory or technique has been 
subjected to peer review and publication." Id. Publication, 
which is an element of peer review, "is not a sine qua non 
of admissibility: it does not equate with reliability." Id. It 
may, however, suggest "good science." Id.  "The fact of 
publication (or lack thereof) in a peer reviewed journal will 
be a relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in 
assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or 
methodology upon which an opinion is premised." Id. at 
594. Third, "in the case of a particular scientific technique, 
the court ordinarily should consider the known or potential 
rate of error, and the existence and maintenance of 
standards controlling the technique's operation." Id. Fourth, 
and finally, "general acceptance" can have bearing on the 
inquiry. Id. "Widespread acceptance can be an important 
factor in ruling particular evidence admissible, and a 
known technique which has been able to attract only 
minimal support with the community may properly be 
viewed with skepticism." Id. However,"general acceptance" 
is "not a necessary precondition to the admissibility of 
scientific evidence." Id. at 597. The Court also emphasized 
that the "inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is . . . a flexible 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Obviously, evidence must first be relevant to be admissible. Relevant 
evidence is evidence that helps "the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Id. at 591. This consideration 
of relevance has been described as one of "fit" or "helpfulness." It 
requires "a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a 
precondition to admissibility." Daubert, at 591-92. 
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one," and noted that the "focus . . . must be solely on 
principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they 
generate." Id. at 595. 
 
Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Daubert , we 
applied its teachings in In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB 
Litigation, 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994)("Paoli II"). There, we 
concluded that Rule 702 has two major requirements; 
"qualifications" and "reliability," and noted that an expert's 
"qualifications" are interpreted liberally. In discussing 
"Reliability" we listed the factors enunciated in Daubert but 
noted the continued vitality of our prior analysis in United 
States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985). We held 
that a "district court should take into account all of the 
factors listed by either Daubert or Downing as well as any 
others that are relevant," Paoli II, at 742, in conducting an 
inquiry into the reliability of proposed expert testimony. The 
factors that are relevant under Daubert and Downing 
include: "(1) whether a method consists of a testable 
hypothesis; (2) whether the method has been subjected to 
peer review; (3) the known or potential rate of error; (4) the 
existence and maintenance of standards controlling the 
technique's operation; (5) whether the method is generally 
accepted; (6) the relationship of the technique to methods 
which have been established to be reliable; (7) the 
qualifications of the expert witness testifying based on the 
methodology; and (8) the non-judicial uses to which the 
method has been put." Paoli II, at 742 n. 8. 
 
In Paoli II, we also stated that the expert's testimony 
must "fit," in that it must assist the trier of fact. Id. at 743. 
Admissibility thus depends in part upon "the proffered 
connection between the scientific research or test result to 
be presented and particular disputed factual issues in the 
case." Id. This standard is not intended to be a high one, 
nor is it to be applied in a manner that requires the 
plaintiffs "to prove their case twice -- they do not have to 
demonstrate to the judge by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the assessments of their experts are correct, 
they only have to demonstrate by a preponderance of 
evidence that their opinions are reliable." Id. at 744. This is 
a very important distinction. The test of admissibility is not 
whether a particular scientific opinion has the best 
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foundation or whether it is demonstrably correct. Rather, 
the test is whether the "particular opinion is based on valid 
reasoning and reliable methodology." Kannankeril v. 
Terminix International Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 806 (3d Cir. 
1997). "The analysis of the conclusions themselves is for 
the trier of fact when the expert is subjected to cross- 
examination." Id. 
 
Nonetheless, "conclusions and methodology are not 
entirely distinct from one another." General Electric Co. v. 
Joiner, 522 U. S. 136, 146 (1997). A court "must examine 
the expert's conclusions in order to determine whether they 
could reliably flow from the facts known to the expert and 
the methodology used." Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc., 167 
F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir. 1999). "A court may conclude that 
there is simply too great a gap between the data and the 
opinion proffered." Joiner, at 146; see also In re TMI 
Litigation, 193 F.3d 613, 682-683 (3d Cir. 1999), opinion 
amended by 199 F.3d 158 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. 
General Public Utilities Corp. v. Abrams, ___ U. S. ___, 120 
S. Ct. 2238 (2000) and Dolan v. General Public Utilities 
Corp., 120 S. Ct. 2238 (2000). 
 
Although Daubert was decided in the context of scientific 
knowledge (whether evidence established a connection 
between the defendant's drug and birth defects), Daubert 
has since been extended to the kind of "technical or other 
specialized knowledge," at issue here. See Kumho Tire Co., 
Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U. S. 137, 141 (1999) ("We conclude 
that Daubert's general holding--setting forth the trial 
judge's general `gatekeeping' obligation--applies not only to 
testimony based on `scientific' knowledge, but also to 
testimony based on `technical' and `other specialized' 
knowledge."). The expert in Kumho Tire was an engineer 
and the Court there framed the issue before it as"how 
Daubert applies to the testimony of engineers and other 
experts who are not scientists." Id. at 141. 
 
We examine the specific testimony that was excluded 
here against this background. "We afford a district court's 
application and interpretation of Rule 702 plenary review, 
Paoli II at 749, but we review the court's decision to admit 
or reject testimony under an abuse of discretion standard. 
Joiner, at 143. An abuse of discretion arises when the 
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district court's decision "rests upon a clearly erroneous 
finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper 
application of law to fact." Hanover Potato Products, Inc. v. 
Shalala, 989 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1993). An abuse of 
discretion can also occur "when no reasonable person 
would adopt the district court's view." Id.  We will not 
interfere with the district court's exercise of discretion 
"unless there is a definite and firm conviction that the court 
below committed a clear error of judgment in the 
conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant 
factors." Id. 
 
IV. THE CHALLENGED EXPERT TESTIMONY. 
 
A. John N. Noettl. 
 
Noettl, the accident reconstruction/design engineer, was 
to testify that the truck was defectively designed. 13 Noettl's 
proffered testimony is contained in a preliminary report 
dated June 16, 1997; an amended report dated December 
4,1997; an affidavit dated September 23, 1998; and two 
depositions. 
 
In his preliminary report, Noettl opined that the truck 
Oddi was driving 
 
       rode up on the guard rail because of the failure of the 
       left side of the front bumper. . . . Had the bumper not 
       significantly deformed back and inward the vehicle 
       would have been deflected by the guard rail. 
 
       It is also my opinion that the floor board allowed 
       intrusion by the guard rail and possibly the concrete 
       barrier into the occupant compartment in the area 
       near the brake pedal and where the driver's feet and 
       legs would be located. This intrusion was a direct 
       cause of the injuries to Mr. Oddi. 
 
       Had the bumper and the floor board been properly 
       structurally designed the vehicle would not have gone 
       over the guard rail and the occupant compartment 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Ford and Grumman do not challenge his qualifications as an expert. 
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       would not have been intruded by the guard rail and 
       concrete barrier. 
 
App. at 104-105. 
 
After he reviewed the deposition of defense expert Donald 
Edelen, Noettl submitted an amended report, dated 
December 4, 1997. In it he stated: 
 
       It is my opinion that [Ford] should have warned 
       [Grumman] of the fact that the front bumper on their 
       chassis is for decorative trim only and will not offer 
       protection to the body and occupant in a collision. As 
       a result of the design of the chassis and bumper, the 
       front wheels of the vehicle become exposed in 
       foreseeable accident situations. Ford should have 
       specifically warned that the bumper was extremely 
       weak due to the fact that it had no backing plate or 
       brackets for reinforcement and because it had holes in 
       the bumper placed immediately adjacent to the outside 
       where the bumper mounted to the chassis. 
 
* * * 
 
       Neither Ford nor Grumman conducted any testing that 
       involved the vehicle impacting with guardrails. Neither 
       Ford nor Grumman incorporated any design(s) into the 
       chassis or body of the vehicle that would prevent or 
       reduce the likelihood of the vehicle going over a 
       guardrail in the event of an impact with a guardrail. 
       Due to the vehicle's height, weight, and design the 
       vehicle as a propensity to ramp up onto the guardrail 
       in foreseeable collision situations.14  . . . This design 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. This sentence could be read as advancing a new theory of design 
defect -- a "propensity to ramp" theory - because of the height, weight 
and design of the truck. That is, it could be taken as a theory separate 
and apart from Noettl's defective front bumper andfloor board theories. 
However, during his second deposition, Noettl clearly stated that he was 
not advancing any such separate theory. He testified: 
 
       Q: Alright. "Has a propensity to ramp." When you say that, you are 
       just telling me that this is a bigger truck. And as a bigger truck, 
you 
       believe that it has more of a propensity to ramp than smaller 
       vehicles? 
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       defect caused or contributed to the cause of the 
       accident and to Mr. Oddi's injuries. 
 
App. at 100-01. 
 
In response to summary judgment motions, in which 
Ford and Grumman noted certain deficiencies in Noettl's 
submissions, Noettl prepared an affidavit which Oddi's 
counsel attached to Oddi's response to the summary 
judgment motions. That affidavit is dated September 23, 
1998, and reads, in relevant part: 
 
       1. Given the basic design of this vehicle, the following 
       is a description of alternative designs that in my 
       opinion, would have (1) prevented the Oddi vehicle 
       from ramping the guard rail and (2) prevented the 
       intrusion which occurred of structural components into 
       the occupant compartment. 
 
       A. A reinforced bumper. The bumper on the subject 
       vehicle had a measured 3.5 X 6.5 inches holes at 
       critical stress points next to the frame rails to which 
       the bumper is attached. The holes were designed and 
       manufactured by the bumper manufacturer. The 
       bumper should have been reinforced at these points by 
       eliminating the holes and/or welding inch to inch steel 
       reinforcement wedges between the frame rails and the 
       upper and lower edges of the back side of the bumper. 
 
       B. Steel brackets should have been welded to the . . . 
       back side of the upper and lower edges of the back of 
       the bumper. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       A: That is correct. 
 
       Q: That is all there is to it? 
 
       A: That is correct. 
 
       Q: And is that a defect? 
 
       A: No. That is not in and of itself a defect. The defects are the 
things 
       we discussed. [i.e., the bumper and floor boards, discussed in a 
       prior deposition]. 
 
Supp. App. at 144a (emphasis added). 
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       C. The bending and tensile properties and or metal 
       thickness of the bumper should have been increased in 
       addition to A or B as described above. 
 
       D. Various bumper configurations such as tubular or 
       cylinder designs should have been manufactured and 
       tested in addition to A, B, and C above. These bumper 
       configurations are stronger than flat bumpers with 
       similar metal characteristics. 
 
       E. The occupant compartment should be reinforced 
       by increasing the bending and tensile properties and 
       metal thickness (by .125 inch increments) in the area 
       of the floorboard and fire wall and\or by welding or 
       forming ribbing to the metal in this area. Safety factors 
       of fifty or hundred percent are common in products. 
 
       2. I have observed bracket and wedge bumper 
       reinforcements on similar vehicles. As to metal 
       thickness -- the steering components on the subject 
       vehicle were protected by a measured .35 inch 
       (approximately) thick steel enclosure while the bumper 
       on this vehicle was designed to be .208 inch thick-- a 
       difference of approximately .142 inch. 
 
       3. Guard rails of this type are common in road way 
       design and vehicle encounters of the type that 
       happened with the Oddi vehicle should be expected by 
       manufacturers. 
 
       4. The design changes I have described were capable 
       of being incorporated into the design and manufacture 
       of this truck in 1976 using basic engineering design 
       and manufacturing techniques. 
 
       5. The design changes I have described would not 
       interfere with the function or intended use of the truck. 
 
       6. In my opinion the above design changes would 
       have greatly increased bumper strength and occupant 
       compartment protection with very little total 
       incremental vehicle manufacturing cost. 
 
       7. It is my opinion that if the design changes 
       described above were incorporated into the 
       manufacturing process of the Oddi vehicle it would not 
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       have ramped on to the guard rail and would not have 
       experiences sudden deceleration from striking the 
       bridge abutment. This would have prevented the 
       intrusions into the occupant compartment and the 
       significant injury which Mr. Oddi sustained. 
 
App. at 123-24. 
 
In one of his depositions, Noettl testified that he based 
the opinions contained in his June 16, 1997 preliminary 
report in part on a review of accident reports, photographs, 
witnesses' statements, Oddi's medical records, and Oddi's 
deposition testimony; and in part on his own [Noettl's] 
"experience," "academic training," and"research that [he 
does] almost on a continuous basis, reviewing technical 
literature." App. at 138-139. However, Noettl was unable to 
identify any particular literature that he relied upon to form 
any of the opinions contained in his preliminary report. Id. 
Noettl testified that he did view films of crash tests in 
forming his opinions, Id. and he insisted that the 
alternative designs he suggested could be found in"any 
machine design book." Id. at 48-49. Noettl did list a 
number of accepted authorities and textbooks in a 
document Oddi's counsel refers to as an "offer of proof." Id. 
at 201. 
 
Ford and Grumman point to specific portions of Noettl's 
depositions which they claim plainly demonstrate that 
Noettl's proffered expert testimony does not meet Daubert 
standards. Noettl opined that the front bumper was 
defective because it "bent back" when it struck the 
guardrail. He explained this was a defect because"it was 
designed with a large lever arm on the vehicle, out from the 
frame rail. It had holes in it for towing, which, in my 
opinion, would greatly weaken the structure, especially with 
that large lever arm on it which would allow it to be bent 
back." App. at 45. Noettl claimed that the bumper should 
have been designed "with either bracketry that would go 
from the frame rail out to the center part of that part of the 
bumper, or what [he referred to] as a backing wedge." Id. at 
47. According to Noettl, the "backing wedge""would be like 
a V[ ]." Id. 
 
However, when Noettl was asked to elaborate upon his 
belief that the bumper was defectively designed because it 
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bent backward upon striking the guardrail the following 
exchange occurred: 
 
       Q: Now, have you determined what force was inflicted 
       on the guardrail at the time of initial impact with the 
       truck? 
 
       A: No, I haven't. No. 
 
       Q: Have you determined what force the truck inflicted 
       on the bridge abutment and the rail on top of the 
       bridge abutment when it made contact with that? 
 
       A: No, the reason for answering both those questions, 
       you would have a range of variables, also, but 
       guardrails are designed to absorb energy and deflect 
       vehicles. You would have to make an awful lot of 
       assumptions. 
 
       Q: Have you determined or measured the strength or 
       rigidity of the guardrail? 
 
       A: No. 
 
       Q: You haven't ascertained how much force it could 
       hold, is that correct? 
 
       A: That's correct. 
 
App. at 43-44. Later in the deposition, Noettl testified as 
follows: 
 
       Q: Do you know how much force it took to bend that 
       bumper to the point where it's bent? 
 
       A: No, I don't. 
 
       Q: Do you know how much force that bumper was 
       capable of sustaining without bending? Have you 
       determined that? 
 
       A: I haven't determined that, right. 
 
Id. at 46-47. 
 
When Noettl was questioned about his proposed designs 
for the bumper, and design changes that would have been 
necessary to remedy the suggested defect, he offered several 
possibilities, but he conceded that he had not attempted to 
test or substantiate the modifications he was suggesting. 
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       Q: What type of metal should the wedge be 
       constructed from? 
 
       A: It could be the same as the bumper, if you wanted 
       to, but you just turn it on end. You could have many, 
       many choices on that. 
 
       Q: What if you used a brace? What type of metal 
       should that brace be constructed from? 
 
       A: Again, you could use the same as the bumper. 
       Again you would have a lot of choices on that. The 
       bracketry would probably not be as strong as the 
       wedge. Probably not. Test it and maybe you would 
       achieve a strength that would far exceed anything you 
       could expect. 
 
       Q: What would be the tensile strength or the gauge of 
       the metal have to be on both of those options? 
 
       A: The way you go through is look up in books and 
       you say, "Here. We got some metal here and let's try 
       this." Certain gauge, certain strength, something that 
       is readily available. It's not a big thing, is what I'm 
       trying to say. You certainly would not cut holes in it 
       right at one of the most critical points of where you 
       major bending force is going to occur, which is at your 
       railing. 
 
       Q: So this would be something relatively simple to 
       look up in a book, and you could determine from the 
       computations in some engineering book what you 
       should be using. What would the name of the book be? 
 
       A: Any machine design book. 
 
       Q: Is that a particular book or is that a type of a 
       book, machine design book? 
 
       A: That's a type of book. 
 
       Q: Could you give me an authority? 
 
       A: There are machine design books that give you all 
       types of metal gauges. If you go through the design 
       process for any of these things on a bumper, frame 
       rails, exactly what they do -- they don't sit down. They 
       don't do finite element analysis. They look up in books 
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       what metal thickness, what's our yield strength, what's 
       our tensile properties of this metal, bang, bang, bang. 
       We're going to use this. 
 
       Q: Have you done that? 
 
       A: No. I haven't done that, no. 
 
       Q: So you don't know what the thickness would have 
       to be, what the metal gauge, what the tensile strength 
       -- 
 
       A: Right. 
 
       Q: -- what type of material you would need to use; is 
       that correct? 
 
       A: I told you I would use -- probably start with the 
       same material that you have in the bumper. Take a 
       piece of metal, turn it on its edge, put it in back of it, 
       weld it on there for a test, see what strength you do 
       gain out of this as far as impact, as far as bending 
       moments and as far as shearing. You sure hope it 
       won't shear off. You would do that. You would say,"I 
       want it a little bit stronger." The easiest way, by far, is 
       to thicken the metal. That's all you have to do. Get a 
       lower gauge metal and put that on there and try it 
       again. 
 
       Q: How thick would the metal have to have been to 
       have not deformed in this impact? 
 
       A: I would say, in my opinion, half inch to an inch 
       and a half range would be more than adequate to 
       withstand the force on edge. That's the thickness, not 
       the width. 
 
       Q: What would the width be? 
 
       A: I don't know. Three inches or so, four inches. 
 
B. Leon Kazarian. 
 
Kazarian, the biomechanical engineering consultant, was 
retained to explain how Oddi received his injuries. Kazarian 
authored a preliminary report, dated June 18, 1997, in 
which he opined: "On impact, the end of the bridge 
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pierced and penetrated the driver's occupant compartment 
impaling, cutting and crushing Mr. Oddi's extremities." The 
report noted that Oddi "was found outside the vehicle on 
the grassy slope next to the bridge." App. at 113. Though 
Oddi had been thrown from the truck, Kazarian concluded 
that Oddi had "sustained his primary injuries at the time 
he was in the driver's seated position," and that his injuries 
occurred "as a result of the bridge piercing, penetrating and 
crushing his extremities while he was in the driver's 
compartment." Id. 
 
The following exchange occurred during Kazarian's 
deposition: 
 
       Q: Have you considered what would have happened to 
       Mr. Oddi in the event that there was no compromise to 
       the floor of the vehicle and he still had the same 
       accident? Are you able to tell us what would have 
       happened to him physically? 
 
       A: No, not as I sit here. 
 
       Q: It could have been worse, it could have been 
       better? 
 
       A: I don't know. 
 
       ****************************** 
 
       Q: And you hold no opinion on whether or not the 
       vehicle mounted the guardrail, correct? 
 
       A: That's correct. 
 
       Q: Given that, have you considered what injuries, if 
       any, Mr. Oddi would have sustained if the vehicle 
       didn't mount the guardrail or ramp the guardrail? 
 
       A: No. 
 
       Q: So I take it that since you haven't considered that 
       aspect, that you hold no opinions as to what injuries, 
       if any, Mr. Oddi would have sustained had the vehicle 
       not mounted or ramped the guard rail. 
 
       A: Yes. As I sit here, I haven't thought about that. 
 
Grumman's Br. at 32. Therefore, although Kazarian 
testified about how Oddi received his injuries, he was 
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unable to offer an opinion on the key aspect of Oddi's 
crashworthiness claim, i.e., whether Oddi's injuries were 
exacerbated by the design of the bread truck. 
 
V. DISCUSSION. 
 
Oddi argues that the district court erred in denying his 
motion for an in limine hearing on the Daubert challenge, 
and in granting summary judgment. We will address each 
argument separately. 
 
A. Necessity for an in limine Hearing under Daubert. 
 
Oddi bases his contention that a hearing was required 
upon Kumho Tire (decided just one week before the district 
court granted summary judgment here), and our holding in 
Padillas.15 We decided Padillas one month after the district 
court granted summary judgment. 
 
Oddi submits that his case had been pending for four 
years before the Supreme Court decided Kumho Tire, and 
that Kumho Tire was not decided until after each of the 
following occurred in his case: (1) he filed his experts' 
reports; (2) his experts had been deposed; (3) defendants 
had filed their summary judgment motions; and (4) he had 
filed his papers in opposition to the summary judgment 
motions. Oddi's Br. at 15. Moreover, he claims that from 
the time he started his lawsuit until Kumho Tire  was 
decided, the law did not assess nonscientific expert 
testimony under Daubert. Id. Nonetheless, the district court 
expressly subjected Noettl's testimony to Daubert scrutiny 
under Kumho Tire. See 3.31.99 Dist. Ct. Op. at 3, 7. 
 
Thus, though not clearly articulated, Oddi is arguing that 
Kumho Tire worked a substantial change in the law and 
that the district court blind-sided him by subjecting his 
experts' testimony to a Daubert analysis. He contends that 
the district court's failure to hold an evidentiary hearing 
"precluded [him] from ever having the opportunity to 
present [his] expert testimony in accordance with the 
Kumho decision." Oddi's Br. at 15. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Although he now makes this argument to us, he never asked the 
district court to conduct such a hearing. 
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Oddi's claim that the scope of Daubert was unsettled 
until Kumho Tire is not without force. See In re Unisys 
Savings Plan Litigation, 173 F.3d 145, 162 n.2 (3d Cir. 
1999) (Becker, J., dissenting). Prior to Kumho Tire, there 
was substantial uncertainty about whether Daubert applied 
to nonscientific expert testimony. Contrast Surace v. 
Caterpillar, Inc., 111 F.3d 1039, 1055-56 (3d Cir. 1997); 
United States v. Valasquez, 64 F.3d 844, 847-50 (3d Cir. 
1995); and Habecker III, at 289-90 (3d Cir. 1994), with 
Lauria v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 145 F.3d 593, 
599 n.7 (3d Cir. 1998).16 In Lauria we not only concluded 
that Daubert scrutiny did not apply to the proffered 
testimony of an engineer, but also that a nonscientific 
expert's testimony was admissible under Rule 702 based 
upon the expert's experience and knowledge. Id.  at 599. 
 
Nevertheless, we do not think that Oddi's reliance on 
Kumho Tire establishes that the district court erred in 
granting summary judgment here without an in limine 
hearing. Oddi was surely alerted to this problem when Ford 
raised a Daubert challenge in its summary judgment 
motion. In his brief in opposition to the defendants' 
summary judgment motions, Oddi specifically discussed 
Daubert, and argued that his experts' testimony satisfied 
Daubert. App. at 70-94. Despite the uncertain scope of 
Daubert, he never argued that Daubert did not apply to 
nonscientific expert testimony. Moreover, Oddi now reads 
far too much into our decision in Padillas. 
 
It is not clear whether Oddi is arguing that Padillas 
always requires a hearing or that the procedural posture of 
his case is so like Padillas that the district court abused its 
discretion by not holding an in limine hearing. In Padillas, 
we focused upon the process by which the district court 
there determined that proffered expert testimony was 
inadmissible under Daubert. 186 F.3d at 417 ("We do not 
reach the question whether the district court abused its 
discretion in holding the [expert's] Report inadmissible 
under Rule 702. Our concern is with the process by which 
the court arrived at its ruling."). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. In Lauria we specifically noted that the Circuit Courts of Appeals 
were split over whether Daubert applied to nonscientific expert 
testimony. Id. at 599 n.7. 
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Padillas had been injured while hosing down a chicken 
cutting machine manufactured by Stork-Gamco. The 
cutting machine had an exposed cutting blade. He sued 
Stork-Gamco alleging strict products liability, negligence, 
breach of warranty and failure to warn. To establish 
liability, Padillas retained an engineering expert (Lambert) 
who opined in a written report that Stork-Gamco's failure 
to provide a guard that would prevent the snagging of the 
hose during wash-down and its failure to protect workers 
from the cutting blade resulted in a defective machine that 
caused his injury. Id. at 416. 
 
Stork-Gamco filed a motion for summary judgment, 
arguing that Lambert's report did not meet the Daubert 
standards for admissibility. The district court agreed, 
excluded the report, and then granted summary judgment 
to Stork-Gamco. In reversing and remanding for an in 
limine hearing on Lambert's proffered testimony we 
criticized the process used by the district court. We noted 
at the outset that we have "long stressed the importance of 
in limine hearings under Rule 104(a) in making the 
reliability determination under Rule 702 and Daubert." Id. 
at 417 (internal quotations and citations omitted). We also 
reiterated the importance of an in limine hearing in ruling 
upon Daubert challenges even in the absence of a request 
for such a hearing. We stated that the district court has an 
"independent responsibility for the proper management of 
complex litigation" and emphasized that the plaintiff 
"need[s] an opportunity to be heard" on the critical issues 
of scientific reliability and validity. Id.  The opportunity to be 
heard is important because it allows a plaintiff"a chance to 
have his or her expert demonstrate and explain the`good 
grounds' upon which the expert evidence rests." Id. at 418. 
 
However, our analysis in Padillas cannot be divorced 
from the record that was before us. In commenting upon 
the district court's Daubert analysis of Lambert's report, we 
noted that it "does not establish that Lambert may not have 
`good grounds' for his opinions, but rather, that they are 
insufficiently explained and the reasons and foundations 
for them inadequately and perhaps confusingly explicated." 
Id. Lambert's report was quite conclusory and did not 
adequately explain the basis for his opinion, or the 
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methodology employed in reaching his conclusions. It was 
in that context that we held that if the district court "was 
concerned with the factual dimensions of [Lambert's] 
evidence . . . it should have had an in limine  hearing to 
assess the admissibility of the report giving the plaintiff an 
opportunity to respond to the court's concerns." Id. (citation 
and internal quotations omitted). We stated, "when the 
ruling on admissibility turns on factual issues, . .., at least 
in the summary judgment context, failure to hold[an in 
limine] hearing may be an abuse of discretion." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 
Oddi attempts to equate the district court's rejection of 
Noettl's testimony here with the rejection of Lambert's 
testimony in Padillas. He submits that the district court 
found the basis of Noettl's conclusions "confusing." Oddi's 
Br. at 13. Consequently, he argues, the district court 
should have conducted an evidentiary hearing as we 
ordered in Padillas. Id. 
 
Initially, we suspect that Oddi is being disingenuous in 
stating that the district court found that the basis of 
Noettl's conclusions was "confusing." The district court's 
reference to "confusion" had nothing to do with its decision 
to exclude Noettl's testimony. Rather, the "confusion" 
stemmed from a statement Noettl made in his December 4, 
1997 amended report. He there referred to an alleged defect 
based upon the height, weight and design of the truck. He 
said those factors created a propensity to ramp. In his 
motion for reconsideration, Oddi claimed that he was 
entitled to reconsideration because the district court 
"disregarded his defect claim regarding the vehicle's 
`propensity to ramp' " because of the size of the vehicle. 
9/2/99 Dist. Ct. Op. at 9-10. The district court's 
"confusion" was nothing more than a reference to the fact 
that neither the court nor the defendants could have 
interpreted Noettl's testimony about the truck's"propensity 
to ramp" as advancing an additional design defect apart 
from the defective bumper and flooring. To alleviate its 
"confusion," the district court reviewed Noettl's deposition 
testimony on that issue and quite correctly concluded that 
Noettl was not raising an alternative or additional design 
defect theory. 9/2/99 Op. at 13. See n.15, supra. Thus, the 
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district court did not disregard any of Noettl's theories and 
was not confused about the basis of Noettl's opinions. 
 
More to the point however, Oddi's attempt to equate his 
circumstances with those in Padillas ignores the record 
here. As noted above, the record in Padillas was scant, and 
the district court therefore had no way of determining how 
Lambert had arrived at his conclusions about the chicken 
cutting machine. Accordingly, we held that the court had 
an independent obligation to reach a decision upon a 
record that had been adequately developed to allow for a 
meaningful evidentiary determination. We based that 
holding upon two separate considerations. "First,. . . the 
court has an independent responsibility for the proper 
management of complex litigation. Second, because plaintiff 
could not have known in advance the direction the district 
court's opinion might take and thus needed an opportunity 
to be heard on the critical issues before having his[/her] 
case dismissed." Id. at 417 (citations omitted). 
 
Here, however, the evidentiary record pertaining to Oddi's 
expert was far from scant. As noted, it consisted of: (1) a 
preliminary report; (2) an amended report, prepared after 
Noettl reviewed the deposition testimony of a defense 
expert; (3) an affidavit specifically prepared to meet the 
defendants' Daubert challenge contained in their summary 
judgment motions; and (4) Noettl's two depositions. The 
district court therefore apparently saw no need to conduct 
a hearing before ruling on the Daubert challenges. This is 
consistent with Padillas and perfectly appropriate under 
Kumho Tire. 
 
In Kumho Tire the expert's proffered testimony was taken 
from deposition testimony. 526 U. S. at 142 ("The plaintiffs 
rested their case in significant part upon deposition 
testimony provided by an expert in tire failure analysis, 
. . . , who intended to testify in support of their 
conclusion."). In the district court, the defendants 
requested an in limine hearing to challenge the plaintiff 's 
expert's proffered testimony. However, the district court 
refused that request, finding that two depositions 
submitted to it (one from the case before it and one from an 
unrelated case involving similar issues) were sufficient to 
allow an inquiry under Daubert. See Carmichael v. Sanyang 
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Tires, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1514, 1518 (S. C. Ala. 1996). In 
approving the process the district court used to conduct its 
Daubert inquiry the Court wrote: 
 
       The trial court must have the same kind of latitude in 
       deciding how to test an expert's reliability, and to 
       decide whether or when special briefing or other 
       proceedings are needed to investigate reliability, as it 
       enjoys when it decides whether or not that expert's 
       relevant testimony is reliable. Our opinion in Joiner 
       makes clear that a court of appeals is to apply an 
       abuse-of-discretion standard when it reviews a trial 
       court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony. 
       That standard applies as much to the trial court's 
       decision about how to determine reliability as to its 
       ultimate conclusions. 
 
526 U. S. at 152 (citations and internal quotations 
omitted)(emphasis added). 
 
The same situation obtains here. Although Oddi 
strenuously claims that he was entitled to an in limine 
hearing, he does not even begin to suggest how such a 
hearing would have advanced his position, and we can not 
begin to imagine that it would have. He does not claim that 
he has any new or additional information to present, and 
he does not claim that the factual record before the district 
court was somehow incomplete insofar as Noettl's 
testimony is concerned.17 Rather, he merely insists that he 
is entitled to a hearing under Padillas. However, "Padillas 
certainly does not establish that a District Court must 
provide a plaintiff with an open-ended and never-ending 
opportunity to meet a Daubert challenge until plaintiff `gets 
it right.' " In re TMI Litigation, 199 F.3d at 159. Yet, that is 
where Oddi's argument would take us. 
 
Moreover, Oddi's reliance upon a denial of an in limine 
hearing also reflects a basic misperception about the nature 
of the hearing the court might have conducted even if it 
had afforded Oddi such a hearing. In Downing, we 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. We do not suggest that the district court would have abused its 
discretion in denying an in limine hearing on this record even if Oddi had 
made these claims. 
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reiterated that trial courts retain significant discretion to 
determine in each instance "the procedure [it] should follow 
in making preliminary determinations regarding 
admissibility of evidence." 753 F.2d at 1241. We said that 
"we will not prescribe any mandatory procedures that 
district courts must follow in every case involving proffers 
of scientific evidence," and then noted "[a] few general 
observations . . ." as to how the preliminary evidentiary 
issues might be decided under Rule 702. We stated: 
 
       It would appear that the most efficient procedure that 
       the district court can use in making the reliability 
       determination is an in limine hearing. Such a hearing 
       need not unduly burden the trial courts; in many 
       cases, it will be only a brief foundational hearing either 
       before trial or at trial but out of the hearing of the jury. 
       In the course of the in limine proceeding, the trial court 
       may consider, inter alia, offers of proof, affidavits, 
       stipulations, or learned treatises, in addition to 
       testimonial or other documentary evidence (and, of 
       course, legal argument). 
 
Id. Here, the district court already had before it the 
depositions and affidavits of the plaintiff 's experts. Nothing 
more was required. 
 
This conclusion is not inconsistent with our recent 
holding in Elcock v. Kmart Corp., __ F.3d __, 2000 WL 
1486489 (3d Cir. Oct. 10, 2000). There, we reversed an 
award of damages and remanded for an in limine  hearing as 
to the admissibility of the testimony of plaintiff 's economic 
loss expert. The witness in question, Dr. Chester 
Copemann, testified as an expert in vocational 
rehabilitation, and his testimony "substantially informed 
the large award for loss of future earnings and earning 
capacity." Id. at * 1. We reversed based upon our 
conclusion that "there should have been a Daubert hearing 
prior to the receipt of Copemann's testimony. . . ." Id. The 
defendant there had "repeatedly requested that the District 
Court conduct a Daubert hearing regarding Copemann's 
methods as a vocational rehabilitationist." Id. at *7. The 
case was litigated before the Supreme Court's holding in 
Kumho Tire, and the district court did not view the 
admissibility of the testimony of plaintiff 's nonscientific 
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expert as a Daubert issue. Id. However, Elcock, like Padillas, 
is a situation where the "gatekeeper" could not determine 
what methodology the expert used, and the reliability of the 
expert's conclusion could therefore not be established. In 
Elcock, we stated: 
 
       [A] review of Copemann's vocational rehabilitation 
       testimony demonstrates the significant reliability 
       questions raised by his methodology and compels the 
       conclusion that a Daubert hearing would have 
       permitted a fuller assessment of Copemann's analytical 
       processes and thus was a necessary predicate for a 
       proper determination as to the reliability of 
       Copemann's methods. 
 
Id. at *8. In other words, a hearing was necessary to 
determine how the expert reached his opinion. Id . at *9 ("An 
expert's opinion is reliable if it is based on the methods and 
procedures of science rather than on subjective belief or 
unsupported speculation; the expert must have good 
grounds for his or her belief.")(citations and internal 
quotations omitted). However, "because Copemann never 
explained his method in rigorous detail, it [was] nearly 
impossible for [the defendant's] experts to repeat 
Copemann's apparently subjective methods. . . " Id. at *11.18 
However, here, Noettl did explain how he arrived at his 
opinion, and he did it in as much detail as possible given 
the nature of his "inquiry." 
 
Accordingly, we reject Oddi's assertion that he was 
entitled to an in limine hearing before the court could reject 
his expert's testimony. Our conclusion does not, however, 
end our inquiry. We must still determine whether the 
district court abused its discretion in ruling that Oddi's 
proffered expert testimony was inadmissible under Rule 
702 and Daubert.19 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. In Elcock, we also concluded that the trial court had erred in 
allowing 
the plaintiff 's economist to testify at trial because his testimony was 
not 
"accompanied by a sufficient factual foundation[to be] submitted to the 
jury." 2000 WL 1486489 at *17. 
 
19. Two small matters also remain that pertain to this portion of Oddi's 
argument. First, Oddi argues that the district court failed to rule on his 
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B. The District Court's Exercise of Discretion. 
 
Because "the evidentiary requirement of reliability is 
lower than the merits standard of correctness," the 
standard for determining scientific reliability"is not that 
high." Paoli II, at 744-45. The test is not "[w]hether the . . . 
expert might have done a better job." Kannankeril, 128 F.3d 
at 809. Nonetheless, even though the Federal Rules of 
Evidence "embody a strong and undeniable preference for 
admitting any evidence which has the potential for assisting 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
motion to strike Grumman's reply brief filed after Oddi filed his response 
to the original summary judgment motions. As noted earlier, Grumman's 
initial summary judgment motion did not raise a Daubert challenge to 
Oddi's experts' testimony. It was only after Oddi responded to Ford's and 
Grumman's summary judgment motions that Grumman asserted a 
Daubert challenge via a reply brief. Oddi thenfiled a motion to strike, 
presumably asserting that the reply brief was filed without leave of 
court. 
However, the district court did not rule on Oddi's motion to strike, and 
Oddi claims that he was prejudiced by the district court's failure to 
strike Grumman's reply brief. The prejudice lies in the fact that, 
according to Oddi, Ford's Daubert challenge was only to Noettl's bumper 
testimony and not the flooring testimony, while Grumman's was to both 
the bumper and flooring. Thus, Oddi argues that he was not able to 
respond the newly asserted challenged to Noettl'sflooring testimony. 
However, Oddi would be hard pressed to demonstrate prejudice because 
Ford's summary judgment motion mounted a Daubert  challenge to 
Noettl's testimony with regard to the bumper claim as well as the flooring 
claim. Thus, even if it is assumed for argument's sake that the district 
court improperly failed to strike Grumman's reply brief, Oddi suffered no 
harm because Noettl's testimony as to both the bumper and the floor 
was attacked at the outset by Ford. Furthermore, Oddi does not cite any 
authority for his contention that it was improper for Grumman to file a 
reply brief or any authority supporting his contention that Grumman's 
reply brief should have been stricken. Consequently, Oddi's prejudice 
argument is without merit. 
 
Second, Oddi argues that the district court did not comply with its 
local court rule 7.1F which requires oral argument for dispositive 
motions "unless expressly precluded by the court." However, this 
argument is also without merit. As the district court expressly noted, it 
is the custom and practice of the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania to preclude oral argument on 
dispositive motions. The ability of the district courts to preclude 
argument is expressly given to the court by the local rule. 
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the trier of fact," Kannankeril, at 806, we do not believe that 
the district court abused its discretion in rejecting Oddi's 
expert testimony here. 
 
As we noted earlier, the factors to be considered in a 
Daubert admissibility inquiry include: 
 
       (1) whether a method consists of a testable hypothesis; 
       (2) whether the method has been subject to peer 
       review; (3) the known or potential rate of error; (4) the 
       existence and maintenance of standards controlling the 
       technique's operation; (5) whether the method is 
       generally accepted; (6) the relationship of the technique 
       to methods which have been established to be reliable; 
       (7) the qualifications of the expert witness testifying 
       based on the methodology; and (8) the non-judicial 
       uses to which the method has been put. 
 
Paoli II, at 742 n. 8. While Noettl clearly meets Daubert's 
qualifications requirement, his expert opinion does not 
satisfy any of the other considerations that determine 
admissibility. 
 
Noettl posited two hypotheses. His first hypothesis was 
that the front bumper's design should have included either 
bracketry or a brace system that would have increased the 
bumper's rigidity, prevented the truck from ramping, and 
deflected the vehicle back onto the roadway after impact 
with the guard rail. His second hypothesis was that thicker 
and/or ribbed metal on the flooring of the cab would have 
retained the integrity of the cab. However, Noettl quite 
candidly testified that he never tested either hypothesis. 
Consequently, he has not satisfied the first of the Daubert 
factors. The Supreme Court has explicitly instructed, 
"[o]rdinarily, a key question to be answered in determining 
whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that 
will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has 
been) tested." Daubert, at 593 (emphasis added). 
 
Although Daubert does not require a paradigm of 
scientific inquiry as a condition precedent to admitting 
expert testimony, it does require more than the haphazard, 
intuitive inquiry that Noettl engaged in. Given Noettl's 
responses, Oddi could not establish the existence of Noettl's 
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methodology and research let alone the adequacy of it.20 
This is illustrated by Noettl's attempt to explain how he 
arrived at his conclusion. Noettl testified that he had 
"studied" bread trucks but was not able to state if they 
were the same kind of truck that Oddi was driving or even 
if they were produced by the same manufacturer. 
 
       Q: What type of vehicles [did you examine]? 
 
       A: Bread trucks. 
 
       Q: Whose bread trucks? Who made them? 
 
       A: They were in front of a grocery store and I walked 
       up and looked at them. I didn't record anything off of 
       them. I seen them [i. e., bracketry or wedge supports] 
       on them [i. e., front bumpers]. 
 
       **************************** 
 
       Q: You didn't make a note of what the bread truck 
       was so you could go back and say, "Here's the design 
       I'm proposing and somebody is already using this." 
 
       A: I said that in my mind, and I had groceries and I 
       didn't have a camera and nothing else. 
 
       Q: You don't remember the name of the bread 
       company? 
 
       A: No, I don't. It might come to me. I can't tell you, 
       no. 
 
       ****************************** 
 
       Q: You don't know whether or not those trucks would 
       have sustained a bending of the bumper the same as 
       this truck because we don't know what the forces are, 
       right? 
 
       A: I would say that they have a better chance, but I 
       can't tell you more than that, no. That's correct. 
 
       ****************************** 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. Methodology is defined as "body of methods, rules, and postulates 
employed by a discipline: a particular procedure of set of procedures." 
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 747 (1990). 
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       Q: But, what you've seen, you don't know whether or 
       not that would have changed the scenario in this 
       accident one way or the other? 
 
       A: I haven't evaluated that. 
 
App. at 53. 
 
Moreover, not only did Noettl fail to test either 
hypothesis, he never even considered the design of the 
guardrail or the possibility that the damage to Oddi's truck 
was a factor of the design of the guardrail, not the design 
of the truck. 
 
       Q: What if the guardrail was deformed and bent back 
       by the force of the impact so it was bent to the point 
       where it was lower than the bumper? Could a ride-up 
       occur then? 
 
       A: It if was bent back further than the bumper's 
       height. 
 
       Q: If it was bent back and, therefore, it was lower 
       than the height of the bumper, could it ride up? 
 
       A: It's possible. I haven't thought of it, and how long. 
       I would have to look at that. If you, your tire is exposed 
       to ramping -- 
 
       Q: If you have the bumper and the guardrail here and 
       the guardrail bends down to a point lower than the 
       bumper, the tire could ride up on it, isn't that correct? 
 
       A: That is a possibility, yes. 
 
App. at 46. 
 
Noettl also conceded that strengthening the bumper as 
he proposed could result in even greater injury because the 
increased rigidity could transmit more force to the driver of 
the truck than the defendants' design. 
 
       Q: To get back to my question, would the energy-- if 
       you had a rigid bumper, on impact, the energy of the 
       impact and the force of the impact would be 
       transferred to the occupants, right? 
 
       A: Some of it would, yes. 
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       Q: More of it would than if you had a bumper that 
       had give to it? 
 
       A: Right. 
 
App. at 40-14. Noettl did not offer any testimony as to the 
point on the continuum between absolute rigidity and the 
rigidity of defendants' design that would achieve greater 
protection than the bumper on Oddi's truck yet afford a 
practical alternative. 
 
Noettl's explanation of the purported defect in thefloor of 
the truck was undermined by the same laws of physics that 
undermined his testimony that the bumper design was 
defective. 
 
       Q: What was wrong with [the floor]? 
 
       A: It wasn't strong enough to prevent intrusion in this 
       type of an accident into the occupant compartment, 
       exposing the driver to the dangers of that intrusion. 
 
       Q: What should have been done? 
 
       A: The metal could have been made thicker. It could 
       have been ribbed. 
 
3/31/99 Op. at 12-3. However's Noettl's own logic clearly 
suggests that any such alteration may well have been less 
able to absorb impact itself, and therefore it may have 
simply transferred even more force to the occupant than 
the defendants' design did. Although it may well be that 
there is an ideal thickness that would have been able to 
absorb far greater force than the defendants' design yet still 
protect the truck's occupant, Noettl was not able to identify 
that point. He was asked "How thick should it have been?" 
He responded: "Well, the way I would do that is to thicken 
the metal and rib it and then do a test to see, if under 
these types of foreseeable accidents, it would really retain 
the integrity of the occupant compartment." 3/31/99 Op. at 
12-13. However, he never did that. Id. 
 
Not only did Noettl not test his hypotheses, he did not 
even attempt to calculate the force that was inflicted on the 
truck by the guardrail at impact; he did not calculate the 
force of the bridge abutment on the truck; and he did not 
measure the strength of the guardrail or determine how 
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much force the guardrail could sustain. He did not know 
how much was required to bend the bumper or penetrate 
the floor, or how much force the bumper or floor could 
withstand. His hypothesis about adding a "wedge" or 
bracket to bumper was likewise without support as he did 
not determine the tensile strength or gauge of whatever 
metal should be incorporated into his alternative design. 
Accordingly, there was no way of knowing if his suggested 
alternative would better protect the cab's occupant, or if the 
suggested modifications were practical. 
 
Essentially, Noettl's expert opinion that the front bumper 
would have sustained the impact with the guard rail and 
not ramped had it been strengthened with either bracketry 
or wedge supports and that the flooring in the occupant 
compartment should have been thicker or ribbed is based 
on nothing more than his training and years of experience 
as an engineer. Although there may be some circumstances 
where one's training and experience will provide an 
adequate foundation to admit an opinion and furnish the 
necessary reliability to allow a jury to consider it, this is not 
such a case. See e.g., Lauria, at 599 (former Conrail 
foreman's many years of experience with railroad track 
equipment, maintenance and safety equipment, qualified 
him as an expert to testify about Amtrak's responsibility to 
inspect and maintain railroad track in a safe condition). 
Noettl's ipse dixit does not withstand Daubert's scrutiny. An 
"expert's opinion must be based on the methods and 
procedures of science rather than on subjective belief or 
unsupported speculation." Paoli II, at 742 (citations and 
internal quotations omitted). 
 
Since Noettl conducted no tests and failed to attempt to 
calculate any of the forces on Oddi or the truck during this 
accident, he used little, if any, methodology beyond his own 
intuition. There is nothing here to submit to peer review, 
and it is impossible to ascertain any rate of error for 
Noettl's assumptions about the forces that caused Oddi's 
horrific injuries. Similarly, no standards control his 
analysis, and no "gatekeeper" can assess the relationship of 
Noettl's method to other methods known to be reliable and 
the non-judicial uses to which it has been put. Clearly, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding 
Noettle's proffered expert opinion testimony. 
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We also note an obvious gap in Oddi's argument. As 
recited earlier, Oddi retained two experts, Noettl and 
Kazarian. The district court also found that Kazarian's 
expert opinion testimony did not satisfy Daubert . 3/31/99 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 15-16. Kazarian's expert opinion went to 
the "enhanced injuries" element of the crashworthiness 
claims. Unless Oddi can establish that the defendants' 
design and/or manufacture enhanced injuries he would not 
have otherwise sustained, or caused him to sustain injuries 
that he would not have sustained otherwise, there can be 
no recovery under a theory of crashworthiness. 
Carrasquilla, 963 F. Supp. at 458. Consequently, even 
assuming arguendo that Oddi convinced us that Noettl's 
testimony was improperly excluded, his failure to address 
the admissibility of Kazarian's testimony means that Oddi 
has no admissible evidence to demonstrate the "enhanced 
injuries" elements of a crashworthiness claim. 21 
 
C. The District Court Properly Granted Summary 
       Judgment on the Negligent Failure to Test Claim. 
 
Finally, Oddi argues that the district court erred by 
granting summary judgment to Ford and Grumman on his 
negligent failure to test claim. As noted, Oddi claims that a 
manufacturer has an affirmative duty to test its product to 
see if it is defective. He then contends that "it is within the 
comprehension of lay jurors to understand that if the 
Defendants had tested this truck, they would have been 
aware that, in an accident, its design would defeat the 
purpose of a guardrail." Oddi's Br. at 27. Accordingly, Oddi 
argues that even if his expert testimony was properly 
excluded, his negligence claim still survives because he 
does not need expert testimony to establish that claim. 
 
As a general principle, "[e]xpert evidence is not necessary 
. . . if all the primary facts can be accurately and intelligibly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. Moreover, Kazarian's testimony would not have been as helpful as 
Oddi believes even if it had been admitted. Kazarian conceded that he 
had no opinion on what injuries Oddi would have suffered had there 
been no compromise to the floor of the occupant compartment and had 
no opinion on what injuries Oddi would have sustained if the truck had 
not ramped the guard rail. 
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described to the jury, and if they, as [persons] of common 
understanding, are as capable of comprehending the 
primary facts and of drawing correct conclusions from them 
as are witnesses possessed of special or peculiar training of 
the subject under investigation." Padillas , at 415-16 
(citation omitted); see also Cipriani v. Sun Pipe Line Co., 
574 A.2d 706, 710 (Pa. Super. 1990)("However, expert 
testimony is not required when the matter under 
consideration is simple and lack of ordinary care is obvious 
and within the range of comprehension of the average 
juror.")(citations omitted). Although expert evidence is 
generally required in a products liability case where a 
defect is alleged, we have never foreclosed the possibility 
that a defective condition may be established through non- 
expert evidence. In Padillas we opined that since the case 
was at the summary judgment stage, it was "premature to 
rule out that testimony and pictures may enable the jury to 
clearly see the construction of the machine and the manner 
of its use, rendering expert testimony unnecessary." 
Padillas, at 416. Consequently, we held that it was entirely 
possible that Padillas' non-expert testimony may be 
"sufficient to submit his claim of defect to the jury." Id. 
 
The truck Oddi was driving is not at all like the chicken 
cutter with exposed blades in Padillas. A whirling cutting 
blade without a proper guard is obviously dangerous. It 
could reasonably be regarded by a lay juror as a design 
defect. In addition, in Padillas, plaintiff offered nonexpert 
testimony including, but not limited to, reports from 
defendant's own employees that referred to "Safety 
Problems," and a report from the defendant's engineering 
manager "addressing problems with the machine . .. 
including `safety concerns [in that the blades were] not well 
grounded.' " 186 F.3d at 415. 
 
We do not believe that a juror could look at the front 
bumper and the flooring of the cab of the truck Oddi was 
driving and reasonably conclude, not only that its design 
was defective, but also that testing would have disclosed 
the defect and that it could have been remedied. Such 
conclusions are within the peculiar competence of experts. 
Inasmuch as Oddi's "defect expert" does not survive 
Daubert scrutiny, the district court properly granted 
 
                                37 
  
summary judgment to Ford and Grumman on Oddi's 
negligent failure to test claim.22 
 
VI. CONCLUSION. 
 
We are not unsympathetic to Oddi. He suffered horrific 
and catastrophic injuries while driving the truck that had 
been designed and/or manufactured by the defendants. 
That does not, of course, establish that either defendant is 
necessarily liable for any of those injuries or that Oddi's 
proffered proof was sufficient to prove liability on their part. 
Nor does our holding suggest that every plaintiff must 
engage in such sophisticated and refined testing (including 
crash-testing) as to preclude a successful suit for damages 
for all but the wealthiest of plaintiffs or a group of plaintiffs 
sufficiently large to allow the economies and practicalities 
of class certification. The inquiry required under Daubert 
ought not to become an impenetrable barrier for plaintiffs 
with limited resources or restricted circumstances. As noted 
above, the Supreme Court reminds us that the "inquiry 
envisioned by Rule 702 is . . . a flexible one." Daubert, 509 
U.S. at 595. It does not require the most elaborate or 
sophisticated tests or studies that can be imagined by 
opposing counsel. Nevertheless, here, the district court's 
inquiry established that Oddi's proffered expert testimony 
was not admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 702, and we 
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in rejecting that evidence. Accordingly, we will affirm the 
district court. 
 
A True Copy: 
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       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. Oddi claims that neither Ford nor Grumman moved for summary 
judgment on his negligent failure to test claim. Oddi's Br. at 27. That is 
incorrect. Ford's and Grumman's summary judgment motions were 
directed to all of Oddi's claims, including his negligence claims. 
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